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This dissertation is about the prospects for non-cognitivism. Chapter One provides some background and
introduces the remaining chapters. Chapter Two focuses on the distinction between non-cognitivism about
moral thought and non-cognitivism about moral discourse. This distinction is often overlooked. I show,
however, that it has at least two important philosophical implications. I also show that Richard Joyce’s
recent attempt to show that the "real" philosophical debate is over the truth of non-cognitivism about moral
discourse fails. Motivation internalism figures in both a standard objection to non-cognitivism and a
standard argument for non-cognitivism. In Chapter 3 I show that two popular versions of motivation
internalism cannot explain why moral matters are practical matters. Chapters Four and Five both deal with
what is widely considered to be one of the most pressing objections to non-cognitivism, the so-called Frege-
Geach problem. In Chapter Four I argue that there is, in fact, no such thing as the Frege-Geach problem
and distinguish four arguments that have been discussed under that heading. I show that while none of
these arguments are conclusive as they stand, they each provide the non-cognitivist with a distinct
challenge. I briefly sketch ways in which non-cognitivists can attempt to answer each challenge. In Chapter
Five I present a recently proposed solution to “the problem of reasoning,” a Frege-Geach style argument
against non-cognitivism, and argue that that solution does not work. 
